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Executive Summary 
 
• For 2004 raw milk prices are expected to be much higher and may well average over the 
$15.00 per cwt farm-gate or mailbox price that most New England farmers need to stay in 
business long term. 
• But by the end of the year Connecticut farmers will be back in a cost-price squeeze with 
mailbox prices below $15.00 per cwt. 
• Milk prices are currently regulated by many states including Pennsylvania, New York, 
Maine, California, and Nevada. 
• Northeast farmers that have suffered low prices relative to cost of production and relative 
to farm milk prices in other regions of the country, most notably the upper Midwest, the 
nearest “supply basin” for the milk deficit Northeast. 
• Absent some form of new state/regional policy intervention it is clear New England dairy 
farmers will continue to go out of business. 
• In New England we have witnessed a serious and substantial departure from competitive 
milk pricing by the regions leading supermarket retailers.  At times it has been as high as 
$1 per gallon.  This overcharge has come from farmers as well as consumers. 
• Recent farm level milk prices, in fact, indicate that Northeast farmers receive LOWER 
NOT HIGHER maibox prices than farmers in the upper Midwest.  These regional prices 
are perverse because farm prices should be substantially higher in the densely populated 
Northeast, the region that “imports” milk and milk products from the upper Midwest. 
• From a consumer perspective as Northeast farmers go out of business, prices for milk and 
milk products from the Midwest that are based on higher raw milk prices will be higher 
not lower.  Northeast dairy farmers are losing out to farmers in other regions, most 
notably the upper Midwest and far west.  Northeast consumers are also losing out and 
will continue to do so in the future. 
• Instead of securing over-order premiums in the relaxed federal order environment, 
Northeast farmers and their cooperatives have had to accept lower prices as powerful 
retailers have demanded price concessions from processors.  Federal order minimum 
prices in the Northeast are a floor that prevents even deeper discounts to powerful 
retailers.  The higher prices that are being paid to Midwest farmers for milk and milk 
products sold in the Northeast over the past 2 years are not being paid to Northeast 
farmers. 
• A second reason that Northeast farmers are losing out to other regions is that they are 
being out flanked in the state, regional and national economic game that is being played 
in the milk policy arena.  Upper Midwest farmers and their cooperatives have been able 
to depool massive amounts of milk during recent price run-ups in butter and cheese 
markets.  Although there is no direct link, depooling seems to enhance the ability to 
capture premiums and increase the farm gate prices relative to the Northeast. 
• A solution to the New England milk-pricing problem is regulation that increases raw milk 
prices paid to Northeast farmers for bottled milk and cuts retail prices paid by New 
England consumers.  This redistribution of the retailers’ excess margin should not affect 
the processors’ margin at supermarket accounts, which our research shows are not 
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excessive.  In fact a lower consumer price from reduced retail margins would benefit 
processors because demand for their milk would increase, and they would be able to 
capture more of their brand equity. 
• Some observers, including lobbyists representing supermarkets, have opposed a state 
level regulatory solution.  Their most common complaint is a philosophical aversion to 
regulation.  Such abstract reasoning hardly merits consideration given the current level of 
regulation in the milk industry and documented poor price performance for Northeast 
farmers and New England consumers.   
• Under the proposed price regulatory authority in Connecticut General Assembly Revised 
Bill No. 5624 the Connecticut Milk Regulation Board will gain regulatory authority more 
in line with that in other states including New York, Pennsylvania, Maine, and California. 
• Traditionally, dairy pricing policy has focused on raw fluid milk prices.  Pricing in the 
down-stream market channel was ignored because the channel was effectively 
competitive.  That no longer is the case.  Farmers now have more compelling options 
than an exclusive focus on getting a higher raw price.  Those options are more 
compelling because they promote economic efficiency, a net gain to society, while 
gaining a higher price. 
• In conclusion, absent redress via enhanced state level regulation dairy farming will 
continue to decline in New England.  Products will come in an increasing fashion from 
the upper Midwest and elsewhere.  Retail prices for milk and milk products based upon 
the higher upper Midwest mailbox prices plus transportation will be higher, not lower.  
Retail prices based upon a lack of competition in our region’s retailing sector will be 
higher, not lower.  Regulation that restores more competitive pricing in our regional dairy 
marketing channel may be able to benefit our region’s farmers, processors, and 
consumers. 
• Connecticut Substitute Bill no 5642 merely gives the Milk Regulation Board the 
authority to regulate the milk marketing channel.  Once it has such authority the MRB 
would have to study the industry and decide whether and how to promulgate price 
regulation.  This first step certainly seems justified given the documented economic 
plight of the industry. 
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Milk Pricing Problems and Solutions:  An Essay on the Need for New State 
Level Milk Price Regulation in the Northeast,  
with Special Attention to Connecticut Substitute Bill No. 5642 
 
by Ronald W. Cotterill 
 
 Before one can talk about solutions to the “milk pricing problem” one needs to identify 
its many dimensions and then target solutions to specific aspects of the problem. 
Is the problem one of supply outpacing demand on the national level?  Is it the importation of 
milk components and products from other countries?  Is it the importation of dairy replacement 
heifers from Canada?  For the Northeast is it the loss of the class 1 fluid differential relative to 
the upper Midwest in the federal milk market orders?  Does pooling of milk from distant 
producers on the Northeast market order lower Northeast farm –gate prices?  Does depooling in 
other market orders, when manufacturing milk prices rapidly increase, disadvantage the 
Northeast?  Is the problem an increasing imbalance of power between Northeast dairy farmers 
who bargain via their cooperatives with processors and retailers in milk marketing channels?  
Specifically, is it an increase in market pricing power by retailers that results in higher consumer 
prices and lower price premiums for farmers? 
 Over the past three years Northeast dairy farmers and consumers have seen not one but 
all of these issues influence milk prices.  For 2004 raw milk prices are expected to be much 
higher and may well average over the $15.00 per cwt farm-gate or mailbox price that most New 
England farmers need to stay in business long term.  Agri-Mark’s March 23, 2004 price forecast 
is for the Boston blend price to average $16.03 per cwt for 2004.  Once one deducts hauling and 
other charges to obtain the farm-gate or mailbox price, it will be close to $15.00 for many 
farmers.  (If you are a farmer you can calculate your own mailbox prices given your known 
deductions relative to the announced forecast Boston blend prices).  This is good news for dairy 
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farmers, but higher prices for feed and fuel will take some of the bloom off of these 2004 milk 
prices.  Moreover milk prices are projected to peak in May 2004 fall thereafter.  By the end of 
the year farmers will be back in a cost-price squeeze with mailbox prices below $15.00 per cwt. 
(See forecast Boston blend prices in Table 1.)  This is not good news for Northeast dairy farmers. 
 Milk prices are currently regulated by many states including Pennsylvania, New York, 
Maine, California, and Nevada.  New York has a price gouging law that triggers investigation of 
retail prices when they are more than 200% of the raw fluid 3.5% butterfat milk price paid by 
processors (Huff 2003).  This regulation has kept average supermarket retail prices in New York, 
well below New England retail prices For example, University of Connecticut research found 
that New York retail prices were 59 cents per gallon less than New England retail prices in 
November 2002 and 70 cents per gallon in June 2003 (Cotterill et al., November 2002 p 24 and 
Rabinowitz et al., September 2003 p 27).   The New York regulatory program, however, 
provides no benefits to Northeast farmers that have suffered low prices relative to cost of 
production and relative to farm milk prices in other regions of the country, most notably the 
upper Midwest, the nearest “supply basin” for the milk deficit Northeast. 
 Absent some form of new state/regional policy intervention it is clear New England dairy 
farmers will continue to go out of business.  Other states in the Northeast will also be affected.  
Milk and milk products will come in an increasing volume from central and western New York 
and from more distant points in the Midwest and far west.  Milk processing and manufacturing 
activities will also continue to exit New England.  Consolidation via mergers and acquisitions 
will continue to transform milk-marketing channels away from competitive markets.  Prices at all 
stages of the market channel will increasingly be dominated by powerful processors and retailers. 
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In addition and in interaction with market power in regional milk markets, dairy policy moves in 
other regions of the country are damaging Northeast dairy farmers and consumers.  In this 
Darwinian world what policy solutions are available to dairy farmers and consumers, the two 
least organized players in the milk industry?  What should the goals of public policy be? 
 National and international policies play an important, even vital, role in directing the 
performance of the milk markets, and the firms that operate in those markets.  Yet we would 
submit that the following statement is true.  The health of the Northeast, and especially the New 
England milk industry, will depend critically upon state and regionally articulated state policies.  
We maintain that this is the case because the region faces distinctly different problems and 
opportunities in addition to the commonly recognized “national and international” problems 
facing the milk industry.  Currently in Connecticut there is a move towards increased state level 
regulation.  The proposed enabling legislation for the Connecticut Milk Regulation Board is 
Attachment A to this paper. 
Under the relaxed federal milk market order structure, today Northeast dairy farmers and 
their cooperatives lack the bargaining power to capture over-order premiums.  Unlike more 
powerful cooperatives in the upper Midwest, they also lack the ability to take maximum 
advantage of depooling when manufacturing milk prices rapidly move up as they have over the 
past year (Cotterill, U.S. Senate Testimony, October 27, 2003).  Our research shows that retailers 
not processors in New England have benefited most from this power imbalance with farmers. 
Retailers in New England have benefited from substantial market power that allowed retail 
prices to remain high as farm prices dropped to depression levels during 2001-2003. 
 To see this, look at Figure 1, a price chart for June 2003.  The first column gives “all 
milk” average prices and margins for the major fluid milk products sold at supermarkets.  
 4
Farmers received $1.03 per gallon.  Processors charged an additional 60 cents per gallon for 
delivering bottled milk into supermarket dairy case coolers.  Thus the average wholesale price 
for delivered milk was $1.63 per gallon.1  Research at Penn State and the New York Dept. of 
Agriculture and Markets on in-store costs for supermarkets including a competitive return on 
invested capital indicates that 45-55 cents per gallon is sufficient.  Larger supermarket chain 
stores are at the lower end of this range.  As documented in Figure 1, large, leading supermarket 
chains in southern New England, however, capture $1.45 per gallon by charging consumers, on 
average, $3.07 per gallon for milk. 
 When one examines prices at the brand level for individual supermarket chains it is clear 
that processors who have differentiated milk to create well known brands such as Hood, Garelick 
and Guida milk capture very little of the brand premiums that consumers pay.  For example, in 
Figure 1, Hood charges Stop and Shop $1.69 per gallon for delivered milk.  This is only 6 cents 
above the average delivered wholesale price for all milk; but, Stop and Shop marks Hood milk 
up much more than other milk: $1.83 per gallon to retail it at $3.51 per gallon.  Hood and other 
milk processors create brands, build brand equity, but capture very little of the premiums that 
brands command in the market place.  This retail price conduct distorts incentives for 
innovations such as the supply of organic milk by farmers, and brand development by farmers as 
well as processors.   
 The prices reported for June 2003 are typical of the prices observed from December 2001 
thru August 2003.  Figure 2 is for March 2003.  Figure 3 is for October 2003.  It shows that retail 
prices increased when farm prices increased in late 2003.  October retail margins decreased; but 
at $1.22 per gallon remain well above in-store costs.  
                                                 
1 This wholesale price estimate is based upon processing cost information obtained from Dairy Technomics, a firm 
that monitors processor costs for supermarket milk buyers (Cotterill et al. April 23, 2003). 
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The conclusion from our retail, wholesale and farm level fluid milk price research over 
the past four years is clear.  In New England we have witnessed a serious and substantial 
departure from competitive milk pricing by the regions leading supermarket retailers (Cotterill 
and Franklin 2001, Cotterill et al. 2002, 2003, and Rabinowitz et al 2003).2    At times it has been 
as high as $1 per gallon.  As we show below, this overcharge has come from farmers as well as 
consumers. 
Let’s gain some perspective on the magnitude of this departure from competition by 
comparing it to the often-asserted claim that the federal market orders exercise market power on 
behalf of farmers at the expense of consumers.  Economists in the Midwest, not strong 
supporters of fluid milk market orders in the past, now maintain that the minimum fluid prices of 
the orders have been so relaxed that flexible pooling and market forces via over-order premiums 
set fluid milk prices and farm-gate prices throughout the country (Jesse et al., 2002).  In other 
words, today fluid milk market orders do not exercise market power that benefits farmers that 
supply more fluid milk (read Northeast) relative to farmers that supply more milk for 
manufactured dairy products (read the upper Midwest and far West).   
Recent farm level milk prices confirm this conclusion.  Northeast farmers have received 
LOWER NOT HIGHER maibox prices than farmers in the upper Midwest for the past two years.  
In 2002, as documented in Table 2, the mailbox price in Wisconsin averaged $12.02 per cwt, and 
                                                 
2 An on going investigation by the State of Connecticut Attorney General, who has subpoenaed milk price and 
margin information from retailers in January 2003, has not contradicted our research findings.  In20011 a joint 
investigation by the Attorneys General of Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island of the Dean Food 
Stop and Shop strategic alliance also raised substantial concerns about noncompetitive fluid milk pricing in New 
England.  The Attorney Generals negotiated a co-processing agreement with Dean that sought to limit the exercise 
of market power by processors and retailers against farmers as well as consumers by facilitating the entry of a new 
processor.  While constructing a new plant that entrant, under the co-processing agreement, can obtain processing 
services from the Dean plant in West Lynn, Massachusetts.  The intent was to protect particularly against processor 
market power, but it also sought to support entry by a new retailer as well as a processor who could compete against 
the coalescing power of a dominant processor and leading retail chains.  This safeguard has not protected farmers 
from low and consumers from high milk prices. 
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it was only $11.88 per cwt in the Northeast.  In 2003, the mailbox price in Wisconsin averaged 
$12.64 per cwt, and it was $12.54 in the Northeast.   
These regional prices are perverse because farm prices should be substantially higher in 
the densely populated Northeast, the region with higher fluid milk consumption and higher 
aggregate demand relative to supply from the Northeast.  Since milk and milk products routinely 
move from the Midwest excess supply region to the Northeast, farm level milk prices in the 
Northeast should be higher than in the Midwest by at least the cost of transportation.  In 
economics, it is a fact that in a competitive market the last unit of supply, ie the marginal unit, 
determines the price for all units sold.  This means that Northeast farmers should be capturing a 
farm gate price that is equal to the Midwest farm price plus transportation. 
This perverse pricing of raw milk in the Northeast has serious implications for the future.  
From a consumer perspective as Northeast farmers go out of business, prices for milk and milk 
products from the Midwest that are based on higher raw milk prices there plus transportation to 
the Northeast will be higher not lower.  Northeast dairy farmers are losing out to farmers in other 
regions, most notably the upper Midwest and far west.  Northeast consumers are also losing out 
and will continue to do so in the future. 
Why are Northeast farmers losing out in the milk supply arena?  One often hears that our 
farmers have higher production costs but there are equally compelling reasons.  One is the 
imbalance in bargaining power between retailers and processors/farmers in the Northeast.  
Instead of securing over-order premiums in the relaxed federal order environment, Northeast 
farmers and their cooperatives have had to accept lower prices as powerful retailers have 
demanded price concessions from processors.  The higher prices that are being paid to Midwest 
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farmers for milk and milk products sold in the Northeast over the past 2 years are not being paid 
to Northeast farmers. 
Table 3 illustrates that service charges and over-order premiums in the Northeast did not 
increase to protect farmers when raw milk prices crashed during the 2001-2003 milk price 
depression.  The Boston Coop Price includes any service charges and over-order premiums paid 
by processors.  Note that they have remained effectively constant at 14-15 cents per gallon since 
October 2001, the demise of the Dairy Compact.  No increase in service charges and over-order 
premiums benefited Northeast farmers when raw milk prices crashed during the milk price 
depression from December 2001 thru August 2003. 
A second reason that Northeast farmers are losing out to other regions is that they are 
being out flanked in the state, regional and national economic game that is being played in the 
milk policy arena.  The Northeast fluid market order has just limited the ability of distant milk to 
join the Northeast milk pool to take advantage of and dilute the impact of its higher fluid price on 
the blend price that Northeast farmers receive (Cheese Reporter, March 26, 2004, p. 1).  Yet 
farmers and cooperatives in the Northeast Order cannot control depooling in other orders.  Upper 
Midwest farmers and their cooperatives depool massive amounts of milk during price run-ups in 
butter and cheese markets.  This happened in 2003 and is now occurring in 2004.  In the first 
instance  depooling affects only the distribution of milk revenue among farmers in a milk market 
order where it occurs.  Farmers or cooperatives who ship to manufacturing plants and depool 
gain at the expense of farmers or cooperatives that supply the fluid market.  Yet there may be a 
secondary effect in markets dominated by manufacturing milk such as in the Midwest.  Fluid 
plants there routinely must pay “give up” charges, i.e. over-order premiums to attract milk from 
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cheese  plants.  These give up charges may be higher when the manufacturing milk prices are 
inverted, ie above the announced fluid class 1 federal order minimum prices. 
A third reason that Northeast farm gate prices are not higher than more distant farm 
prices is the fact that the class 1 fluid milk price differential in the federal order system has not 
been increased in over 25 years.  At Boston one adds $3.25 per cwt. to the Eau Claire, Wisconsin 
price for manufacturing milk.  This is only $1.55 per cwt. more than the $1.70 added for fluid 
milk in the upper Midwest.  As the general price level has increased over the past 25 years, the 
value of this $1.55 fluid price advantage for the Northeast in the federal order minimum prices 
has decreased.   
 The following conclusions are warranted.  Milk market orders are no longer reliable 
vehicles for milk price enhancement in the Northeast relative to the Midwest.  Moreover farmer 
cooperatives within the confines of market orders exercise little or no market power to the 
benefit of producers closer to large fluid milk markets such as Northeast dairy farmers.3  But, 
New England retailers do exercise market power in the milk channel.  The documented a dollar 
per gallon widening of the retailers’ margin in New England during the recent farm milk price 
depression is an $11.60 per hundredweight power premium.  This retailer market power 
premium  effectively equals what the farmer received for the milk that was bottled at the depths 
of the recent milk price depression.  This imbalance in pricing power threatens the viability of 
New England dairy farming, harms processors and consumers, and invites regulation.  State 
regulation reduce the retailer power premium to the advantage of northeast farmers and  also 
reduce consumer prices. Regulation can also offset regional inequities in the milk policy game as 
                                                 
3 Compared to the co-op dominated Midwest, independent farmers in the Northeast limit cooperative power. There 
are approximately 4,000 independent farmers in the Northeast milk market order (Rasmussen). 
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currently played in Washington and other regions of the country that disadvantage Northeast 
farmers. 
 As stated above a regulatory solution to the New England milk-pricing problem can 
increase prices paid to Northeast farmers for bottled milk and cut prices paid by New England 
consumers.  This redistribution of the retailers’ excess margin should not affect the processors’ 
margin at supermarket accounts, which our research shows are not excessive.  In fact a lower 
consumer price from reduced retail margins would benefit processors because demand for their 
milk would increase.  Research at the University of Connecticut and separate research at the 
University of Wisconsin indicate that a 10% market wide price reduction increases supermarket 
sales of milk about 7% (Cotterill and Franklin, 2001).  Regulation that cuts retail margins on 
branded milk would also benefit processors who are currently losing most of their brand 
premium to retailers. (See processor and retail margins for branded milk in Figures 1 – 3.) 
Some observers, including lobbyists representing supermarkets, have opposed increased 
state level regulation in New England.  Their most common complaint is a philosophical 
aversion to regulation.  Such abstract reasoning hardly merits consideration given the current 
level of regulation in the milk industry and documented poor price performance for Northeast 
farmers and New England consumers.   
Some nondairy farmers and the Connecticut Farm Bureau have expressed opposition to 
retail level milk price regulation out of a fear that it might spread to other farm products.  Milk 
prices at the retail level have been regulated in New York for 13 years and longer in other states.  
To our knowledge no nondairy farmers or farm organizations in those states have ever expressed 
such fears.  State milk price regulation is unique and has not been extended to other agricultural 
commodities.   
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Under the proposed price regulatory authority in Connecticut General Assembly Revised 
Bill No. 5624 the Connecticut Milk Regulation Board will gain regulatory authority more in line 
with that in other states including New York, Pennsylvania, Maine, and California.   Here we 
will discuss the merits of regulation that influence retail as well as raw fluid prices. 
 Traditionally, dairy pricing policy has focused on raw fluid milk prices.  Pricing in the 
down-stream market channel was ignored because the channel was effectively competitive.  That 
no longer is the case.  The “no regulation” alternative for a state such as Connecticut is not a 
competitive market channel; it is a noncompetitive system influenced by regulation in other 
states, regions, and by the federal government.  Farmers now have more compelling options than 
an exclusive focus on getting a higher raw price.  Those options are more compelling because 
they promote economic efficiency, a net gain to society, while gaining a higher price.   
Under proposed regulation, a higher farm price is justified as part of a regulatory program 
that restores more competitive pricing in the market channel.  That regulatory program can also 
neutralize policy impacts from other regions and the national level that disadvantage Northeast 
farmers.  Finally, it can return value from the market channel to preserve open space and rural 
economies in the Northeast. 
There are at least three arguments why farmers (and the Connecticut Milk Regulation 
Board) should be focused on channel margins as well as the raw price that farmers receive.  First, 
under the Dairy Compact farmers received a higher raw price and the expectation was that a 
more stable raw price would reduce the market margin to offset part of the higher raw price 
(Federal Register, May 30, 1997).  But retailers raised the retail price by even more than the 
Compact-created raw milk price increase and attributed all of that retail price increase to the 
Dairy Compact program (Cotterill and Franklin, 2001, Cotterill and Dhar 2003).   
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Second, channel firms vigorously opposed and defeated the extension of the Dairy 
Compact in 2001 with the assertion that lower raw fluid prices would translate into much lower 
retail fluid prices.  In fact their economic analysis predicts that the actual 50-cent per gallon drop 
in raw fluid price that happened after the Compact would create an 80 cent drop in retail prices 
(Bailey, 2001).  As shown in Figures 4 for Hartford and Figure 5 for Boston, retail prices 
dropped 10 cents.  Retailers’ margins widened from an already uncompetitive level to those 
documented in Figures 1 thru 3.4 
 A third reason farmers and the Connecticut Milk Regulation Board should consider retail 
price cuts as well as raw fluid price increases is perhaps the most powerful from a pure economic 
perspective.  Attachment B to this paper is selected pages from an undergraduate microeconomic 
theory textbook by B. Peter Pashigian titled, Price Theory and Applications.  The front page for 
Chapter 19, “Impediments to Economic Efficiency” lists the three ways a market can depart from 
a competitive and efficient organizational structure.  The New England and Connecticut milk 
market channels deviates for two of the three reasons, market (monopoly) power at retail and 
externalities at the farm level.  The latter are important and include the provision of open space 
and other environmental and cultural amenities that dairy farms supply at no charge.  We will not 
discuss farm level externalities here, except to observe that they also provide a very important 
arguement for increased dairy farm income.   
 Page 696 from the Pashigian text deserves a close read because it succinctly explains how 
monopolistic pricing against consumers reduces economic efficiency.   Retail milk prices that are 
                                                 
4 After the demise of the Compact, farmers received Milk Income Loss Contract payments from the federal 
government during the 2001-2003 milk price depression to cover part of their losses.  Yet who has benefited most 
from this federal subsidy program?  Since the program was capped at 3.4 million pounds per year (about 125 cows), 
New England farmers who on average have larger herds received less support than Midwest farmers where most 
herds are smaller than 125 cows.  Also in New England, to a very large extent, the retailers took advantage of the 
low raw fluid market prices and did not pass them on to consumers as low retail prices.  Again, see Figures 4 and 5 
to examine how prices changed when the Compact expired after October 2001. 
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above the cost to produce and distribute fluid milk are noncompetitive.  In New England we find 
that retail prices may be as much as a dollar above actual costs that include a competitive profit.  
Pashigian concludes that this situation is not economically efficient. 
“…the economy is not hitting on all cylinders.  The problem is that the product 
mix is no longer Pareto-efficient.  Because price is higher under monopoly than 
under competition, the economy produces too little of X {milk} and too much of 
Y {other products}.”  Brackets added for clarification.  (Pashigian, p. 696). 
 
This textbook example focuses only on market power being exercised against 
consumers (monopoly).  It can also be expanded to focus on market power being 
exercised against the farmers who supply raw milk (monopsony).  Large and powerful 
buyers, such as the regions’ leading supermarket chains, have driven very hard bargains 
with processors and ultimately the farmers that supply them therefore curtailing or 
eliminating over-order premiums that raise farm mail box prices.  This powerful conduct 
towards farmers also reduces economic efficiency and reduces the amount of milk sold.  
As explained earlier, mailbox prices for the Northeast compared to the upper Midwest 
show that buyer power is not as effectively countervailed in the Northeast by farmer 
cooperatives and state or regional pricing structures.  Federal Order minimum prices in 
the Northeast are the primary price protection that Northeast farmers have in the fluid 
market. 
In conclusion, absent redress via enhanced state level regulation, dairy farming 
will continue to decline here.  The current constellation of private economic power and 
public policy is clearly not favorable to the Northeast.  Northeast dairy farmers will 
continue to receive lower prices than upper Midwest dairy farmers because market power 
and policy imbalances pervert normal spatial pricing that would give farmers in the milk 
deficit Northeast higher raw milk prices.  Products will come in an increasing fashion 
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from the upper Midwest and elsewhere.  Wholesale prices for milk and milk products 
based upon the higher upper Midwest mailbox prices plus transportation from the 
Midwest will be higher, not lower.  Retail prices based on these higher wholesale prices 
will be higher, not lower.  Finally, retail prices based upon a lack of competition in our 
region’s retailing sector already are higher, not lower.   
Regulation that restores more competitive and fair pricing in our regional dairy 
marketing channel can benefit our region’s farmers, processors, and consumers.  
Connecticut Substitute Bill no 5642 merely gives the Milk Regulation Board the 
authority to regulate the milk marketing channel.  Once it has such authority the MRB 
would have to study the industry and decide whether and how to promulgate price 
regulation.  This first step certainly seems justified given the documented economic 
plight of the industry. 
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Table 1. Actual and Forcast Boston Blend Price @ 3.5% Butterfat*
2003 2004
January 12.19 13.58
February 11.79 13.95
March 11.47 15.00
April 11.45 17.02
May 11.60 18.39
June 11.66 17.87
July 12.46 17.12
August 13.72 16.64
September 15.01 16.53
October 15.21 16.29
November 14.95 15.50
December 14.39 14.46
Annual Average 12.99 16.06
Source: Agri-Mark - March 24, 2004
Note: March 2004 - Deecember 2004 are forcasted prices
* The blend price is the price farmers receive for all milk sold prior to 
deductions for transportation and other services/programs.
Table 2. Farm Mailbox Milk Prices for 2002 and 2003*
Northeast Wisconsin Minnesota
Avg 2002 11.88 12.02 11.83
January 11.62 11.59 11.52
February 11.22 11.28 11.21
March 10.86 10.70 10.72
April 11.06 10.85 10.86
May 11.10 11.04 10.95
June 11.07 10.90 10.89
July 11.63 12.26 12.51
August 12.87 13.98 14.32
September 14.49 14.95 15.10
October 15.23 15.57 15.59
November 14.98 14.80 14.72
December 14.39 13.77 13.47
Annual Averag 12.54 12.64 12.66
Source: Dairy Market News, USDA
*Mailbox prices are the price that farmers actually receive 
after deductions for transportation and other 
services/programs and addition of any over-order 
premiums.
Table 3:  Hartford and Boston Retail Milk Prices and Raw Fluid Milk Prices
Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon
Jan'96 1.38 2.38 1.39 2.37 1.45
Feb 1.38 2.40 1.39 2.38 1.45
Mar 1.36 2.41 1.37 2.41 1.44
Apr 1.35 2.40 1.36 2.40 1.42
May 1.36 2.40 1.37 2.39 1.43
Jun 1.41 2.42 1.40 2.41 1.47
Jul 1.45 2.44 1.46 2.43 1.53
Aug 1.47 2.46 1.48 2.38 1.54
Sep 1.52 2.45 1.52 2.39 1.59
Oct 1.55 2.46 1.56 2.43 1.63
Nov 1.59 2.50 1.60 2.45 1.66
Dec 1.49 2.50 1.49 2.41 1.59
Jan'97 1.27 2.51 1.28 2.42 1.37
Feb 1.25 2.49 1.25 2.45 1.35
Mar 1.30 2.49 1.31 2.45 1.40
Apr 1.34 2.49 1.35 2.45 1.42
May 1.34 2.49 1.35 2.45 1.43
Jun 1.25 2.49 1.26 2.44 1.36
Jul 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.64 1.46
Aug 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.63 1.46
Sep 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.63 1.46
Oct 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.62 1.46
Nov 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.63 1.46
Dec 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.63 1.46
Jan'98 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.60 1.46
Feb 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.59 1.48
Mar 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.60 1.47
Apr 1.46 2.69 1.46 2.60 1.47
May 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.60 1.46
Jun 1.46 2.61 1.46 2.54 1.46
Jul 1.46 2.60 1.46 2.55 1.46
Aug 1.46 2.60 1.46 2.57 1.46
Sept 1.54 2.61 1.55 2.58 1.59
Oct 1.56 2.64 1.57 2.58 1.61
Nov 1.57 2.66 1.58 2.58 1.62
Dec 1.65 2.74 1.66 2.71 1.70
(continues)
January 1996 - April 2004
Boston Class I 
& Compact
Hartford Class I & 
Compact
Boston Retail 
Price
Hartford Retail 
Price
Boston 
Coop Price
Table 3. (continued)
Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon
Jan'99 1.72 2.89 1.73 2.89 1.77
Feb 1.76 2.89 1.77 2.89 1.81
Mar 1.67 2.88 1.68 2.81 1.72
Apr 1.46 2.73 1.46 2.67 1.46
May 1.46 2.67 1.46 2.72 1.46
June 1.46 2.68 1.46 2.72 1.46
July 1.46 2.64 1.46 2.72 1.46
August 1.46 2.63 1.46 2.64 1.46
Sept 1.46 2.70 1.46 2.66 1.49
Oct 1.63 2.87 1.64 2.91 1.68
Nov 1.67 2.95 1.68 2.89 1.72
Dec 1.46 2.91 1.46 2.83 1.46
Jan'00 1.46 2.91 1.46 2.92 1.46
Feb 1.46 2.84 1.46 2.85 1.46
Mar 1.46 2.81 1.46 2.83 1.46
Apr 1.46 2.79 1.46 2.81 1.46
May 1.46 2.82 1.46 2.84 1.46
Jun 1.46 2.83 1.46 2.83 1.46
Jul 1.46 2.85 1.46 2.82 1.46
August 1.46 2.84 1.46 2.85 1.46
Sept 1.46 2.83 1.46 2.82 1.46
Oct 1.46 2.83 1.46 2.82 1.46
Nov 1.46 2.87 1.46 2.87 1.46
Dec 1.46 2.94 1.46 2.88 1.46
Jan'01 1.47 2.87 1.48 2.90 1.52
Feb 1.46 2.94 1.46 2.92 1.46
Mar 1.46 2.90 1.46 2.90 1.46
Apr 1.46 2.96 1.46 2.94 1.48
May 1.49 2.98 1.50 2.95 1.54
Jun 1.56 2.98 1.57 2.98 1.65
Jul 1.59 3.01 1.60 3.01 1.68
August 1.60 3.00 1.60 3.02 1.74
Sept 1.61 3.06 1.62 3.08 1.76
Oct 1.64 3.07 1.65 3.08 1.79
Nov 1.63 3.10 1.63 3.08 1.77
Dec 1.30 3.00 1.31 2.99 1.45
(continues)
Hartford Class I & 
Compact
Hartford Retail 
Price
Boston Class I 
& Compact
Boston Retail 
Price
January 1996 - April 2004
Boston 
Coop Price
Table 3. (continued)
Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon Per gallon
Jan'02 1.30 3.01 1.31 2.99 1.45
Feb 1.30 3.00 1.31 2.98 1.44
Mar 1.27 3.00 1.28 2.99 1.42
Apr 1.26 2.99 1.27 2.99 1.40
May 1.24 2.99 1.25 2.99 1.39
Jun 1.22 2.99 1.23 2.99 1.37
Jul 1.18 2.99 1.19 2.99 1.33
August 1.17 2.99 1.18 2.97 1.30
Sept 1.17 2.99 1.18 2.97 1.30
Oct 1.14 2.99 1.15 2.97 1.27
Nov 1.18 2.99 1.19 2.97 1.31
Dec 1.18 2.99 1.18 2.97 1.30
Jan'03 1.18 2.99 1.19 2.97 1.31
Feb 1.15 2.99 1.16 2.97 1.28
Mar 1.11 2.99 1.12 2.97 1.24
Apr 1.10 2.99 1.11 2.97 1.23
May 1.11 2.99 1.11 2.97 1.23
Jun 1.11 2.99 1.12 2.97 1.24
Jul 1.11 3.02 1.12 2.97 1.27
Aug 1.21 3.02 1.22 2.97 1.37
Sept 1.45 3.07 1.46 3.06 1.60
Oct 1.50 3.10 1.51 3.06 1.65
Nov 1.51 3.11 1.52 3.06 1.66
Dec 1.46 3.18 1.47 3.13 1.62
Jan'04 1.29 3.18 1.30 3.13 1.44
Feb 1.27 3.08 1.28 3.03 1.42
Mar 1.30 3.08 1.31 3.03 1.45
Apr 1.44 1.45 1.60
Source: Data from Order One Market Administrator and Dairy Market News
Note: Northeast Dairy Compact began 7/97 and ended 9/01
Boston 
Coop Price
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Figure 1: Actual Raw Milk, Estimated Wholesale, and Actual Retail Milk Pricing by Brand for 
the Four Leading Supermarket Chains in Southern New England: June 2003
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Figure 2: Actual Raw Milk, Estimated Wholesale, and Actual Retail Milk Pricing by Brand for 
the Four Leading Supermarket Chains in Southern New England: March 2003
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Figure 3: Actual Raw Milk, Estimated Wholesale, and Actual Retail Milk Pricing by Brand for 
the Four Leading Supermarket Chains in Southern New England: October 2003
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Figure 4.
Source: Data from Order One Market Administrator and Dairy Market News 
Vertical lines indicate beginning (7/97) 
and end (9/01) of Northeast Dairy Compact.
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Figure 5.
Source: Data from Order One Market Administrator and Dairy Market News
Vertical lines indicate beginning (7/97) 
and end (9/01) of Northeast Dairy Compact.
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General Assembly  Substitute Bill No. 5642 
February Session, 2004 *_____HB05642ENV___031704____*
 
 
 
 
AN ACT CONCERNING THE MILK REGULATION BOARD.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General 
Assembly convened: 
 
Section 1. (NEW) (Effective from passage) The Commissioner of 1 
Agriculture, in consultation with the Milk Regulation Board, shall, not 2 
later than January 1, 2005, adopt regulations, in accordance with the 3 
provisions of chapter 54 of the general statutes, regarding a system of 4 
milk prices, premiums and fees.  Such regulations may include (1) a 5 
minimum price to be paid by milk dealers for Class I milk, Class II 6 
milk and Class III milk, as defined by the United States Department of 7 
Agriculture (7 CFR 1000), and (2) a premium to be paid by dealers or 8 
retailers to producers for milk.  Such regulations shall take into 9 
account the price paid to milk dealers for the various classes or grades 10 
of milk defined by the Federal Milk Order applicable to Connecticut, 11 
the cost of producing milk in this state and the public interest. 12 
This act shall take effect as follows: 
 
Section 1 from passage 
 
ENV Joint Favorable Subst.  
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